On 8 March 2026, the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the country in a state of defense following what it described as a “brutal and unprovoked Iranian aggression”—the launch of more than 1,400 ballistic missiles and drones targeting infrastructure and civilian sites, causing civilian deaths and injuries. The UAE condemned the attacks as “a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter, an infringement of the UAE’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a direct threat to its security and stability”. This article examines the legal character of Iran’s actions as an act of aggression, the significance of UN Security Council Resolution 2817, the viability of Iran’s purported reliance on Article 51 of the UN Charter, the remedies available to affected GCC states and companies, and the procedures for raising international claims. Drawing on the Ukraine precedent and scholarly literature on the crime of aggression, it outlines a roadmap for accountability.
The Actus Reus of the Act of Aggression
Under international law, the crime of aggression criminalizes individuals for their contributions to state aggression, which is defined as a particularly grave and manifestly illegal use of force by a state. Article 8bis of the Rome Statute defines the crime of aggression as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”. The actus reus, or material elements, of this crime are broken down into three components: conduct, consequence, and circumstance.
The conduct element is constituted by the verbs “planning, preparation, initiation or execution” of an act of aggression. These verbs denote chronological stages leading to collective action: planning refers to participation in devising a proposal for military action; preparation denotes the creation of conditions enabling such action, such as acquiring weapons and recruiting troops; initiation captures strategic-level decisions directly leading to the use of force; and execution encompasses all further actions in furtherance of aggression. The disjunctive “or” means that criminal conviction can be secured if the prosecution proves involvement in only one of these stages.
The consequence element is the material act of use of violence, understood in its naturalistic sense as a perceivable result of the perpetrator’s conduct, divorced from any legal evaluation. This is distinct from the circumstance element, which is the legal-evaluative concept of an “act of aggression” that manifestly violates the UN Charter. An act of aggression is defined as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”. Article 8bis (2) of the Rome Statute lists examples of qualifying acts, with military invasion featuring prominently.
Critically, not all uses of armed force amount to aggression. International law evaluates the use of armed force on a three-tiered scale: mere use of force (the baseline level, resulting only in state accountability); armed attack (at the intermediate level, triggering the right of self-defense); and act of aggression (the most severe breach of the prohibition of use of force). For an act of aggression to entail criminal liability, its “character, gravity, and scale” must manifestly violate the UN Charter. The Kampala Understandings clarify that aggression “is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force” and that “the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ determination”.
Applying this framework to Iran’s actions against the UAE, the launch of over 1,400 ballistic missiles and drones targeting infrastructure and civilian sites, causing civilian casualties, would appear to satisfy all elements of an act of aggression. The character of the attack (unprovoked missile strikes against a sovereign state), its gravity (targeting both infrastructure and civilian sites with lethal consequences), and its scale (over 1,400 projectiles) strongly suggest a manifest violation of the UN Charter. Moreover, each subsequent act of illegal armed force by the aggressor state following the initial breach extends the crime and may incur individual criminal responsibility, as a singular act of illegal use of armed force can lead to criminal responsibility if it either constitutes manifest aggression in itself or forms part of broader hostilities that collectively amount to the state conduct element.
UN Security Council Resolution 2817
On 12 March 2026, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2817 at the request of the GCC states, condemning Iran’s missile and drone strikes against the UAE and other GCC countries as acts of aggression.The resolution carries legal weight given the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter, and its power under Article 39 to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
Resolution 2817 has significant implications for any international claims that the UAE and other GCC states may pursue against Iran. First, a Security Council determination of aggression constitutes the most authoritative finding available under the international legal order, and would carry substantial evidential weight before the International Court of Justice or any other adjudicative body seized of the matter. Second, the resolution may serve as a basis for activating the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, thereby circumventing the jurisdictional limitations that arise where the aggressor state has not ratified the Kampala Amendments.Third, the resolution strengthens the legal foundation for compensation mechanisms, following the precedent of UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), which established Iraq’s liability for losses arising from its invasion of Kuwait and led to the creation of the United Nations Compensation Commission.
From a procedural standpoint, Resolution 2817 also serves to rebut potential jurisdictional or admissibility challenges that Iran might raise. A Security Council determination that Iran’s actions constitute aggression would make it considerably more difficult for Iran to contest the characterisation of its conduct before international courts or tribunals. Moreover, the resolution’s explicit language may preclude Iran from invoking procedural objections relating to the political nature of the dispute or the absence of prior negotiation, given that the Security Council has already seized itself of the matter and made a binding determination under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Can Iran Rely on Article 51 of the UN Charter?
In its public statements Iran has sought to justify its military operations against GCC states by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting that the presence of United States military bases in GCC countries constitutes an act of aggression against Iran, thereby triggering Iran’s inherent right of self-defence. This argument is without merit under established international law, for the reasons set out below.
First, Article 51 permits the exercise of self-defence only “if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”. The International Court of Justice has consistently held that the right of self-defence is subject to a high threshold: the use of force must amount to an “armed attack” of sufficient gravity, as distinct from a mere frontier incident or other less grave form of the use of force.In the Nicaragua case, the Court drew a clear distinction between “the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack)” and “other less grave forms”, holding that only the former give rise to the right of self-defence. The mere presence of foreign military installations on the territory of a neighbouring state does not remotely approach this threshold.
Second, even if one were to accept that the hosting of foreign military bases could in principle constitute a relevant use of force, there is no basis for attributing an armed attack to the GCC states themselves. The presence of US military facilities in GCC countries is the product of bilateral defence cooperation agreements between sovereign states, entered in the exercise of their sovereign prerogatives. The ICJ’s jurisprudence requires that an armed attack be attributable to the state against which self-defense is exercised., The GCC states have not launched, directed, or participated in any armed attack against Iran, and the hosting of allied military personnel cannot be treated as equivalent to an armed attack by the host state.
Third, and more fundamentally, it is well established in international law that the hosting of foreign military bases does not constitute an act of aggression. The UN General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression, annexed to Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974, provides an exhaustive list of acts qualifying as aggression, including invasion, bombardment, blockade, and allowing one’s territory to be used for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state.The mere stationing of foreign military personnel pursuant to lawful bilateral agreements does not fall within any of these categories. Indeed, Article 3(f) of the Definition of Aggression addresses only the situation where a state places its territory at the disposal of another state “for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State” — a provision that requires active facilitation of an aggressive act, not the passive hosting of military installations.The ICJ confirmed in the Armed Activities case that the threshold for a finding of aggression requires active participation in or substantial involvement with the armed attack in question. Iran’s argument therefore conflates the lawful exercise of sovereign defence cooperation with an act of aggression, a position that finds no support in treaty law, customary international law, or the jurisprudence of the ICJ.
Remedies Available to GCC Countries
The remedies available to the UAE and other affected GCC states may be pursued along several parallel tracks: criminal prosecution, civil proceedings before international courts, sanctions, and compensation mechanisms.
Criminal Prosecutions. Criminal prosecutions for aggression and related crimes can be initiated at multiple levels. Domestically, states may prosecute acts of aggression, violations of the rules of warfare, and genocide under their own criminal codes. States not directly involved in a conflict may also open investigations under universal jurisdiction provisions, as Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania did in the Ukraine context. The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, though its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is limited by the requirement that both the aggressor and victim states have signed the Kampala Amendments or that the UN Security Council refers the matter. Where these conditions are not met, the creation of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression—as proposed in the Ukraine context—offers an alternative pathway to overcoming jurisdictional and immunity obstacles.
Civil Cases Before International Courts. The International Court of Justice allows states to bring complaints against other states for violations of various treaties. In the Ukraine precedent, Ukraine filed an application against Russia under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, attracting a record number of third-party interventions. GCC states could similarly institute proceedings before the ICJ based on applicable treaty obligations and violations of the UN Charter. Senior officials have stressed that increased state consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction and compliance with its decisions could strengthen the rule of law.
Targeted Sanctions. One of the most immediate quasi-judicial tools is the use of targeted human-rights sanctions, which broadly freeze assets of and deny visas to designated persons or entities. However, this remedy may have limited efficiency in this specific case given that Iran is already under the significant sanctions, and introducing further restrictions may not have a serious effect on it.
Compensation Mechanisms. Speaking again about the Ukrainian precedent, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in November 2022 recommending that member states work with Ukraine to create a “register of damage,” recording evidence and claims related to damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia’s wrongful acts, with a compensation mechanism to help pay out these claims with confiscated assets. This model could be replicated for the UAE and other GCC states affected by Iranian aggression.
Remedies for Affected Companies
Companies from GCC countries that have suffered economic damage as a result of Iranian aggression may also pursue compensation. The Council of Europe’s Register of Damage, established in May 2023 following Russia’s launch of its military operation in Ukraine, provides a concrete model. The Register was established as the first concrete legal step in the evolution of a formal compensation mechanism, empowered to receive and process information on claims of damage and evidence, categorize and classify such claims, and assess their eligibility for inclusion. Under its statute, claims may be logged relating to damage incurred on or after the date of the invasion, within the victim state’s
territory, and by the aggressor’s internationally wrongful acts.
Historically, three broad types of international mechanisms have been used to resolve economic claims arising from state aggression. First, international commissions or tribunals under the auspices of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), which was created by UN Security Council resolution in 1991 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and afforded both individuals and corporations the right to bring economic claims before adjudicatory panels. Second, bilateral or ad hoc multilateral agreements, such as the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), which was formed to resolve claims arising from the 1979 hostage crisis and has awarded over US$2.5 billion to U.S. companies and nationals. Third, single-country-administered processes under domestic law, such as the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which has processed 660,000 claims as part of 47 different claims programs.
For companies affected by Iran’s aggression against the UAE and other GCC states, the most practical approach may be a multilateral ad hoc adjudicative mechanism, established by international agreement among Iran, the affected GCC states, and other jurisdictions whose nationals or companies seek compensation. Such a mechanism could be convened by a neutral third country and would possess jurisdiction over private and government claims, expropriations, debts, and contracts. However, the establishment of a UN-administered mechanism may be complicated if Iran enjoys the support of any permanent Security Council member with veto power (such as, for example, Russia or China).
Procedures for Raising International Claims Against Iran
The procedural framework for pursuing claims against Iran draws from the evolving Ukraine model and established precedents. The process may be organized in several stages.
Stage One: Establishing a Register of Damage. Following the Ukraine model, the first step would be the creation of a formal register of damage to document and catalog claims. The Council of Europe’s Register, signed by 44 countries and the EU, provides a template: it has separate legal personality and is empowered to receive, process, categorize, and assess the eligibility of claims for inclusion, without exercising adjudication functions. For GCC states, a similar register could be established under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, or another multilateral body.5
Stage Two: Developing an Adjudication Mechanism. Once claims are registered, an adjudication mechanism must be agreed upon. The UNCC model, where adjudicatory panels of expert commissioners assessed the validity and amount of claims with the assistance of a technical secretariat, offers one approach. The IUSCT model, where both parties appointed arbitrators and the procedure was adapted from UNCITRAL arbitration rules, offers another. The choice of mechanism will depend on the broader geopolitical context and the willingness of Iran to participate.
Stage Three: Securing Funding. The question of how compensation will be funded is directly related to when and how sanctions against Iran will be lifted. In the Ukraine context, pending U.S. and UK legislation has tied the lifting of sanctions to Russia’s agreement to participate in an international claims resolution mechanism, with the option of confiscating frozen sovereign assets if the aggressor refuses to participate. A similar approach could be adopted with respect to Iranian assets frozen under existing or new sanctions regimes.
Stage Four: Prosecution and Documentation. Any party that has suffered economic damages should develop a strategy for documenting and valuing its claims promptly and effectively so that those claims can be pursued once an adjudication mechanism becomes operative. Companies and financial institutions operating in or with respect to the Iranian economy must also monitor developments in the evolving sanctions landscape, as the details of sanctions imposed now will impact the ability of potential claimants to register and successfully prosecute their claims later.
Conclusion
Iran’s missile and drone strikes against the UAE and other Gulf countries constitute a clear case of state aggression under international law, satisfying the elements of character, gravity, and scale required for a manifest violation of the UN Charter. UN Security Council Resolution 2817 reinforces this determination at the highest level of the international legal order, providing a firm foundation for the pursuit of claims and rebutting potential jurisdictional or admissibility objections. Iran’s purported reliance on Article 51 of the UN Charter is without merit, as the hosting of foreign military bases does not constitute an armed attack, is not attributable to the host state as an act of aggression, and falls outside the recognised categories of aggression under international law. The legal frameworks developed in earlier precedents — criminal prosecution, civil proceedings, sanctions, and compensation mechanisms — provide a comprehensive model that GCC countries can adapt to pursue accountability and redress. Affected states and companies should begin documenting their claims now, in anticipation of the formal mechanisms that will follow.
Key Contacts
Mohamed Al Marzouqi, Partner, Head of Office – Abu Dhabi, Co Head of Dispute Resolution, m.almarzouqi@tamimi.com
Igor Gorchakov, Partner, i.gorchakov@tamimi.com